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 Executive Summary 
 
Rules of Origin (RoO) are essential part of trade rules that become very important in 
the context of increasing globalisation of production process. Most industrial goods 
today incorporate inputs from a wide variety of countries (e.g. automobiles, electronic 
goods etc) and when traded it becomes important to determine their country of origin 
as tariffs depend on country of origin. International production networks (IPN) 
promote this new pattern of trade, such that goods travel across several locations 
before reaching final consumers. Consequently, trade in such products can grow 
without a commensurate increase in their final consumption as production networks 
are extended across space. Thus in short, RoO define nationality of traded products. 
Recognising the importance of the IPN, Asia is emerging as a global hub with rising 
regional trading agreements acting as facilitators in the process. Rules of origin in 
trade agreements (Free Trade Agreements or Preferential Trade Agreements) acts as a 
crucial factor in the case of fragmented trade compared with trading in conventional 
final products. Since value added at each stage of production is normally relatively 
little, this kind of trade presumably is more sensitive to trade costs and delays arising 
from rules of origin compliance. In such arrangements RoO try to ensure that tariff 
preferences are enjoyed only by member country imports and not outside imports. 
The current study performs a critical investigation of RoO in selected regional trade 
agreements (RTAs) in the Asia Pacific region, and has made attempts to study 
linkages with intra-regional trade in some sectors such as textiles, electronics in the 
form of integrated circuits, and automobile components. The study addresses the 
provisions of RoO for select trading agreements, compares their restrictiveness and 
product specific features (if any) and makes attempts to connect them with changes in 
intra-industry trade indexes. 
 
The main hypothesis of the study is that an RTA/FTA with relatively simpler RoO 
promotes intra-industry trade and thereby helps IPN to grow. As mentioned earlier, 
components are in general low value products and thus the reduction of barriers 
should increase trade in components, which accounts for a significant portion of total 
intra Asian trade. The study has been done mainly through secondary data analysis. 
RoO provisions of important regional agreements (such as AFTA, SAARC, Japan-
Singapore, India-Thailand, ASEAN-China, etc) have been studied in details with 
respect to some thrust industries which includes automobiles, electronics, integrated 
circuits, etc.  
The study reflects that simpler RoO with product specific rules can act as a catalyst in 
trade even if tariff rates are not so low. The analysis guides us to assess sector specific 
restrictiveness across the agreements for possible growth of IPN. It has also been 
noted through the regression analysis that a higher RoO restrictiveness index inhibits 
the positive growth of intra-industry trade. Policy makers will get an empirical 
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1.  Introduction 
 
In any trade agreement, Rules of Origin (RoO) is indispensable as they define the 
conditions that a product must satisfy to be deemed as originating from the country 
seeking preferential access. The objective is to prevent trade deflection, whereby 
products from non-participating countries destined for the partner country’s market 
are redirected through free trade partners of the partner country to avoid payment of 
the partner country’s customs duties. However, there are several intricacies in RoO 
which restrict the flow of goods in the region and introduce new uncertainties in trade. 
The complexities surrounding rules of origin may be traced from two sources. One is 
the difficulty of ascertaining origin in a regime of increasingly fragmented production 
processes. Whenever there are multi stage production process involved, RoO is used 
to define the methods for ascertaining whether a product has undergone sufficient 
working or processing in the free trade partner to qualify for preferential access. The 
other reason behind the complex design of many RoO is the convenience in which 
these rules may be used to both accommodate and conceal protectionist intentions. By 
attaching multiple criteria for the satisfaction of origin, RoO may be another avenue 
to effectively exclude product groups from a country’s liberalization commitments. 
The economic impact of preferential RoOs can be gauged in terms of the incentives 
they provide for producers to substitute higher-cost inputs from member economies 
for cheaper or better quality imported inputs from non-members in order to qualify for 
concessional entry. These costs can outweigh gains associated with more liberal trade 
relations between members of a preferential trade agreement (PTA). RoO can also 
adversely influence investment decisions and give rise to significant compliance and 
administrative costs for businesses and governments, respectively. The impact of RoO 
depends on a range of global and national factors. If economic costs are likely to rise, 
RoO may encourage trade diversion away from least-cost sources. This result depends 
on factors such as: 
  the margin between preferential tariff rates and Most-favour Nation (MFN) 
rates; 
  the overall stringency of the criteria for conferring origin; and 
  the extent to which prescriptive RoO are used merely to limit the effects of  
preferential tariffs to members of an agreement or to achieve industry policy 
objectives. 
 
A nation’s trade policies depend on the country of origin determination for exported 
and imported goods. Determining the country of origin of traded products is thus an 
important issue. The Kyoto Convention (1973) prescribed three rules for determining 
origin: a specified percentage of value to be added locally in the exporting country; 
change in tariff classification of the final product from its imported intermediate 
inputs; and specific technical requirements. Countries use these rules in varying 
combinations and there is no universal set. The lack of harmonization of rules of 
origin is primarily due to the fact that the effects of a given rule will vary depending 
on the relative comparative advantages of the signatory countries in the production of 
relevant inputs.  Imposing harmonized preferential RoO would only make sense if all 
countries had identical endowments. In reality this is not possible. RoO are applied to 
both preferential (used in preferential trading arrangements) and non-preferential 
trade (MFN trade). 
 
  1In 2009, different regional co-operations like APEC, recognized Rules of Origin is a 
priority area promoting more business-friendliness
1.   Recent studies have revealed 
that costs associated with administering rules of origin comprise around 6 percent of 
the value of goods traded within NAFTA
2, and as much as 25 percent of the value of 
goods traded within ASEAN
3.  These numbers suggest that preferential margins must 
at least be equivalent to the costs to positively influence trade flows. For example, in 
the APEC region, documents and procedures administering preferential rules of origin 
are as complex as the rules themselves as they are usually the outcome of a negotiated 
process.  Studies have found out that trade in parts and components occupy a 
significant portion of the intra-regional trade in Asia. Most of the Asian countries are 
engaged through some kind of regional trade arrangement with each other which is 
governed by different types of RoO.   The complex RoO is expected to harm the 
natural growth of trade in components. As components are mainly of low value-added 
products, a small decrease in tariff rates, relaxation of non-tariffs and other barriers 
including RoO will give a major boost to SMEs in the region.
4  
 
Against this backdrop, the current study performs a critical investigation of RoO in 
selected regional trade agreements (RTAs) in the Asia Pacific region, and has made 
attempts to study linkages with intra-regional trade in some sectors such as textiles, 
electronics in the form of integrated circuits, and automobile components. The study 
addresses the provisions of RoO for select trading agreements, compares their 
restrictiveness and product specific features (if any) and makes attempts to connect 
them with changes in intra-industry trade indexes. 
 
Methodology and Data 
 
Under the Kyoto Convention there are typically three tests which can be carried out to 
assess the rules of origin for a specific trading agreement, any one of these tests be 
required: 
  Change in tariff classification (CTC) test — a good is transformed if there is a 
change in tariff classification using the HS code; 
  Specified process test — a good is transformed if it has undergone specified 
manufacturing or processing operations which confer, or do not confer, origin 
of the country in which they were carried out.  
  Regional value content (RVC) test — a good is transformed if a threshold 
percentage value of locally or regionally produced inputs is reached in the 
exporting country. 
                                                 
 
1 Page 3 of 2009 APEC Secretariat Report on APEC Developments released in 22
nd Marine Resource 
Conservation Working Group Meeting, Vancouver, Canada1-3 June 2009 
2 Carrière, C. and J. de Melo, 2004. “Are Different Rules of Origin Equally Costly? 
Estimates from NAFTA”, CEPR Discussion Paper No. 4437. 
3 Manchin, M. and A. O. Pelkmans-Balaoing, 2007. “Rules of Origin and the Web of East Asian Free 
Trade Agreements”. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4273 (July).   
4 Nag Biswajit & Debdeep De, 2008, ‘Integration of small and medium-sized Enterprises in 
International Production Networks: The automotive industry in Asia’, published in  Macao Regional 
Knowledge Hub, Working Papers, No. 12, December 2008 .  
 
 
  2Following this, an index methodology has been adopted (as discussed in Section 3) 
specific to the trading agreements investigated in the study. The overall index score 
for a particular set of RoO reflects the number of restrictions that are applied and the 
relative importance of those restrictions. The higher the overall index, the more 
restrictive is the trading regime for the members of that trade agreement. Within each 
restriction category, a score is assigned to the particular category of origin 
determination. The score ranges from 0 (least restrictive) to 1 (most restrictive). Each 
category also receives a weighting that indicates the relative restrictiveness of that 
category on the aggregate merchandise trade and firms’ economic efficiency. 
Categories are differentiated with respect to primary, secondary and other criteria 
which include sector specific rules.  For a particular RoO regime, the index value 
reflects the number of restrictions applied, the relative importance of each of those 
restrictions (the weight) and the restrictiveness of each variant (the score).    
The main hypothesis of the study is that an RTA/FTA with relatively simpler RoO 
promotes intra-industry trade and thereby help international production network (IPN) 
to grow. As mentioned earlier, components are in general low value products and thus 
the reduction of barriers should increase trade in components, which accounts for a 
significant portion of total intra Asian trade.  
The study was primarily carried out via secondary data analysis. RoO provisions from 
important regional agreements such as AFTA, SAFTA, Singapore-Japan, India-
Thailand, China-ASEAN FTA were studied in detail. These agreements were chosen 
as they are the most active one in South and South East Asia. Some sectors such as 
electronics/integrated circuits, textiles, and auto components have been chosen to 
understand how intra-industry trade has changed over the time and what the 
corresponding dynamics of tariff reduction are in those sectors. An attempt has been 
made to link the restrictiveness of RoO with trade growth of these sectors. All 
agreements incorporate a ‘cumulative’ rule to accommodate the regional value 
addition in the production process though there is a variation in the additional 
capacity to cumulate diagonally or fully. The study has also looked into this aspect. 
These sectors are identified as they consist of a large share of the intra-industry trade 
in the region.  
 
2.  The Relevance of RoO to Regional Development 
 
The literature on RoO cites a few negative economic effects of RoO especially in the 
context of preferential trading arrangement (like FTAs). Firstly, they give incentives 
to producers to purchase intermediate goods from domestic sources, even if they are 
costlier than imported inputs, so that their final export product meets RoO 
requirements (of high local value contents) and thereby qualifies for preferential 
treatment under the FTA. Thus trade is diverted from low-cost non-member countries 
(countries not party to the FTA) to high-cost member countries (Krueger 1993). From 
an analytical point of view, the basic effect of the RoO is to raise the production costs 
of the product in order to meet the binding RoO (Krishna and Krueger 1995). To meet 
RoO requirements, producers of export products might have to change their 
production decisions regarding where to purchase inputs, locate production, market 
their products, etc. Consequently, the RoO affect producers’ cost structures, 
productivity and competitiveness. Restrictive preferential RoO may lead to 
investment diversion in the long run (Krishna 2005). They may motivate firms to 
  3locate plants that produce intermediate goods within the territory of certain member 
countries to satisfy these rules despite the fact that those territories may not be the 
best locations from an economic point of view. Under some circumstances, they may 
serve as significant trade barriers. Even for relatively simple products like food 
products, substantial transformation requirements in RoO (and restrictions on 
ownership of capital equipment, such as vessels in the case of fisheries) could prove 
to be effective mechanisms that prevent the actual utilization of trade preferences and 
lead to the erosion of benefits. This is because compliance with such rules affects 
decisions of firms with respect to sourcing and production. For this reason, RoO tend 
to increase the cost of production, such that when preferences are utilized, they are 
used to sell goods that cost more than they would were the rules not in place. 
 
Simple and flexible RoO help business and industries achieve economies of scale. 
Ideally, this should be beneficial to both multinationals and small and medium 
enterprises. International production networks promote new patterns of trade, such 
that goods travel across several locations before reaching final consumers, and the 
total value of trade recorded in such products exceeds their value added by a 
considerable margin. Consequently, trade in such products can grow without a 
commensurate increase in their final consumption as production networks are 
extended across space. The increased import content of exports has highlighted the 
importance of the rules applied to determine the origin of traded goods. Recognizing 
the importance of international production networks, some of the trading agreements 
encourage and promote their development. Asia is emerging as a global hub with 
rising trade in electronic goods like integrated circuits, textiles and automobiles and 
components. Rules of origin in trade agreements act as a crucial factor in the case of 
fragmented trade compared with trading in conventional final products. Since 
relatively little value is added at each stage of production, this kind of trade is 
presumably more sensitive to trade costs and delays arising from rules of origin 
compliance. Last is cumulation of origin, which implies that inputs from preferential 
trading partners can be used in the production of a final good without undermining the 
origin of the product.  
 
The Kyoto Convention recognizes two basic criteria for determining origin: wholly 
obtained or produced, and substantial transformation
5.  The wholly obtained or 
produced category applies only to one PTA member, and asks whether the 
commodities and related products were entirely grown, harvested, or extracted from 
the soil in the territory of that member, or manufactured there from any such products. 
The rule of origin is met by not using any second-country components or materials. 
Most countries apply this strict and precise definition.  The substantial transformation-
criterion is more complex, involving four main components that can be used on their 
own or in combination with each other. The first component of the substantial 
transformation criterion is a change in tariff classification (CTC) between the 
manufactured good and the inputs from extra-PTA parties used in the production 
process. The CTC may require the product to alter its chapter (2 digits under the 
Harmonized System), heading (4 digits), subheading (6 digits) or item (8-10 digits) 
                                                 
 
5  The Revised Kyoto Convention is an international instrument adopted by the World Customs 
Organization (WCO) to standardize and harmonize customs policies and procedures around the world. 
The WCO adopted the original Convention in 1974. The revised version was adopted in June 1999. 
  4numbers in the exporting PTA member.  The second criterion is an exception attached 
to a particular CTC (ECTC). ECTC generally prohibit the use of non-originating 
materials from a certain subheading, heading, or chapter. The third criterion is value 
content (VC), which requires the product to acquire a certain minimum local value in 
the exporting country. The value content can be expressed in three main ways: as a 
minimum percentage of value that must have been added in the exporting country 
(domestic or regional value content, RVC); as the difference between the value of the 
final good and the costs of the imported inputs (import content, MC); or as the value 
of parts (VP), whereby originating status is granted to products meeting a minimum 
percentage of originating parts out of the total. The fourth RoO component is 
technical requirements, which require the product to undergo certain manufacturing 
operations in the originating country.  Technical requirements (TECH) essentially 
prescribes or prohibits the use certain input(s) and/or the realization of certain 
process(es) in the production of the good. This is a particularly prominent feature in 
RoO governing textile products. 
 
Besides product-specific RoO, RoO regimes vary by the types of general RoO they 
employ—including in the degree of de minimis, the use of the roll-up principle, and 
the type of cumulation chosen. First, most PTAs contain a de minimis rule, which 
allows for a specified maximum percentage of non-originating materials to be used 
without affecting origin status. Second, the absorption principle allows materials that 
have acquired origin status by meeting specific processing requirements to be 
considered originating when used as input in a subsequent transformation. That is, 
when allowed, non originating materials are not taken into account in the calculation 
of the value added in the subsequent transformation. Third, cumulation allows 
producers from one PTA member to use materials from another PTA member (or 
other members) without losing preferential status for the final product. There are three 
types of cumulation. Bilateral cumulation operates between two PTA partners and 
permits them to use products that originate in the other PTA partner as if they were 
their own when seeking to qualify for preferential treatment in that partner conferred 
by the PTA. All RoO regimes basically apply bilateral cumulation. Under diagonal 
cumulation, countries tied by the same set of preferential origin rules may use 
products that originate in any part of the common RoO zone as if they originated in 
the exporting country. This really means that where there is an agreement signed by 
more than two parties, materials originating in any party are cumulable. The only 
broad exception to this is the Pan-Euro Cumulation System (PECS) where the 
European Union (EU) has separate agreements with several countries, and permits 
cumulation among them conditional on their signing bilateral agreements with each 
other that specify the same RoO as do their agreements with the EU. Full cumulation 
extends diagonal cumulation. It provides that countries bound by the same RoO 
regime can use goods produced in any part of the common RoO zone even if these 
were not originating products: any and all processing done in the zone is calculated as 
if it had taken place in the final country of manufacture. As such, diagonal and full 
cumulation can notably expand the geographical and product coverage of a RoO 
regime.
6
  Whereas  de minimis, roll-up, and cumulation allow for leniency in the 
                                                 
 
6 For bilateral cumulation, the use of partner country components is favored; for diagonal cumulation, 
all the beneficiary trading partners in the cumulation area are favored. Full cumulation is more liberal 
than diagonal cumulation in that it allows greater use of third-country materials. However, it is rarely 
allowed in RoO regimes. 
  5application of RoO, there are three provisions that may have the opposite effect, 
namely increasing the stringency of RoO
7. First, most PTAs contain a separate list 
indicating the operations that are in all circumstances considered insufficient to confer 
origin, such as preservation during transport and storage, as well as simple operations 
such as cleaning, sorting, painting, packaging, assembling, and marking and labeling. 
Second, many PTAs prohibit duty drawback—precluding the refunding of tariffs on 
non-originating inputs that are subsequently included in a final product that is 
exported to a PTA partner. Many developing countries employ drawback in order to 
attract investment and to encourage exports; however, drawback in the context of a 
PTA is viewed as providing a cost advantage to PTA-based producers who export 
their final goods over producers selling their final goods in the domestic market.
8 The 
end of duty drawback entails an increase in the cost of non-originating components 
for PTA-based final goods producers in the country or countries that permitted 
drawback ex ante.  Agreements between countries that had drawback provisions 
before the agreements generally do not prohibit drawback as part of the agreement.  It 
is only the case in agreements where one or more parties do not have a drawback 
provision before the agreement that they seek to prohibit such a program as a 
condition for preferential access. As such, the end of drawback in the presence of 
cumulation may encourage intra-PTA producers to shift to suppliers in the cumulation 
area (WTO 2002). Third, a complex method of certifying the origin of goods can 
impose high administrative costs on exporters. The main certification methods are self 
certification by exporters, certification by the exporting country government or an 
industry umbrella group to which the government has delegated the task of issuing the 
certificate, and a combination of private self-certification and public governmental 
certification. The more numerous the bureaucratic hurdles and the higher the costs for 
an exporter to obtain an origin certificate, the lower the incentives to seek PTA-
conferred preferential treatment. Countries with greater bureaucratic hassle may find 
it difficult to manage the cumulation system and thereby reduce the use of this 
incentive by traders. 
 
 
3.  Empirical Assessment of RoOs 
 
It is a general consensus that RoO should be less restrictive. The restrictiveness index 
shown in the Appendix clearly indicates that rules of origin have far reaching 
implications, as some FTAs are associated with rather high degrees of restrictiveness. 
Thus though the objective of rules of origin is to increase the trade flow, how much it 
has facilitated that objective may be drawn into question for each FTA, depending on 
the complexity of procedures and other trade distorting factors. Ideally, RoO should 
be as neutral as possible in their impacts on trade flows. (Scollay 2003) Simpler RoO 
will help promote regional trade and the international competitiveness of member 
states. This is also of particular relevance in compliance with and administration of 
trade and customs procedures. To minimize the potential for unproductive rent-
seeking and corruption, a simple and transparent ROO is important. (ADB 2002) 
                                                 
 
7 Non-members of a cumulation area may view the cumulation system as introducing another layer of 
discrimination by virtue of its provision of incentives to member countries to outsource from within the 
cumulation zone at the expense of suppliers outside the zone. 
8 Cadot, de Melo and Olarreaga (2001) show that duty drawback may have a protectionist bias by 
reducing the interest of producers in lobbying against protection of intermediate products. 
  6The internationalization of production and accompanying technological change 
requires modifications in RoO, especially in product groups where technologies and 
production processes change rapidly. RoO should be flexible enough to accommodate 
these changes. Otherwise, they will cause unnecessary wastes of time and lost 
opportunities. On the other hand, there should be well-defined procedures or guiding 
principles for the introduction of amendments in the harmonized RoO. This is because 
the consequent uncertainty regarding RoO would increase burdens on negotiators 
from developing countries. (Harilal and Beena 2003) 
 
Additionally, cumulation provides a certain degree of flexibility among producers to 
source of their inputs. However it may also require the consideration and balancing of 
other national interests such as commitments in other arrangements, be they 
multilateral or preferential. For example, full cumulation is an important factor in the 
development of regional production networks. This provides for deeper integration 
and allows for more advanced countries to outsource labor-intensive production 
stages to low-wage partners. Coupled with simple RoO, full cumulation should make 
it easier for regionally-based firms to exploit economies of scale. (Brenton 2003). 
Finally, the treatment of duty drawback and of outward processing aside from free 
trade or preferential trade partners may also be considered. (Brenton 2003).  
 
Restrictive RoO can discourage exporters from taking advantage of tariff preferences 
provided by FTAs, undercutting the economic gains of FTAs which suggests there 
may be under utilization of FTA preferences. Two pioneering works on this subject 
are Estevadeordal (2003) and The Productivity Commission (PC, 2004). The PC 
provides a comprehensive index approach for measuring the stringency and 
restrictiveness of RoOs and improves on Estevadeordal’s index, which is too simple 
to use for empirical work. Both approaches are designed to calculate the degree of 
restrictiveness of RoOs, making the numerical comparison of FTA RoOs possible. 
The PC approach has a bottom-up structure, requiring an initial survey of detailed 
components of the RoO in the relevant appendix of a FTA, and aggregation of those 
into relevant upper categories. Each component is valued with weights for higher 
categories, and aggregated up to the top level for a single index number. The top level 
has three categories: primary criteria, supplementary criteria, and other RoO effects. 
Primary RoO criteria in most FTAs have two components: the wholly obtained 
criterion and the substantial transformation criterion. In order to mitigate the 
restrictiveness of the RoO, supplementary criteria such as Cumulation and De 
Minimis have been widely adopted. In particular, Singapore’s FTAs introduce 
outward processing to facilitate global outsourcing and the flow of intermediate goods 
across countries.  If a product is ‘wholly obtained’ in the exporting country (such as 
agricultural commodities), origin will be granted without any further rules. If products 
are manufactured in the exporting country using only such ‘wholly obtained’ 
materials they will also get preferential treatment right away. But if imported 
materials from non-member countries are used in the manufacture of a product then 
there are two rules which must both be met to satisfy ‘origin.’ First, the value of the 
imported materials may not exceed 65 per cent of the f.o.b. value for the concerned 
product (for example, implying 35 per cent DVA
9) Second, the product should be 
classified under a different H.S. level heading (4-digit) than that in which the 
                                                 
 
9 DVA: Domestic Value Added 
  7imported materials used in its manufacture are classified (CTC)
10. As mentioned 
above, there are no sector- or product-specific TECH. CTC and RVC are commonly 
used to define substantial transformation. However, the most stringent rule, technical 
processes (SP) is rarely applied. In defining substantial transformation with RVC, 
different thresholds may be adopted. For example, the US sets a relatively high 
requirement in NAFTA but a low RVC ratio in its FTA with Singapore. Different 
ratios of RVC are reflected by relevant weights in calculating the restrictiveness 
index. 
 
Table 1: Restriction categories for preferential RoO 
Number Restriction  category  Weight 
Primary criteria  0.60 
1  Change in tariff classification   0.20 
2  Regional value content or percentage criterion  0.20 
3  Specified manufacturing process test and/or sector-specific 
rules 
0.20 
Supplementary criteria  0.25 
4  Type of cumulation  0.05 
5  Provisions that go beyond cumulation  0.05 
6 Duty  drawback  0.05 
7  Territoriality or outward processing  0.05 
8 Geographic  location  of  manufacturing process  0.05 
Other effects of RoO  0.15 
9  Degree of certainty  0.05 
10  Compliance and administration costs  0.05 
11 Rigidity  0.05 
Total weight  1.00 
Source: Productivity Commission (2004) 
 
4.  RoO Provisions in Selected FTAs and BTAs: 
 
Estevadeordal and Suominen (2006) observe that Asian FTAs such as the ASEAN 
Free Trade Area (AFTA), South Asian Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA) and others 
indulge the propensity to expand existing FTAs to new members or create new 
country-combinations of FTAs. In doing so they increasingly introduce product-
specificities into their RoOs. This can be seen in new arrangements such as the 
ASEAN-China FTA and the recently signed ASEAN-Korea FTA. The relatively 
ample allowance for imports in the AFTA stems from the realization that for many 
heavily-traded products in the region, like electronics, production processes may be so 
splintered that the value of local content is often a small percentage of the product’s 
total value. Very early on in the formation of AFTA, it was recognized that the 40% 
ASEAN origin rule would often not be met in the case of trade in textiles and textile 
products. In 1995, it was therefore decided that either the percentage value-added or 
the substantial transformation rule may be used by ASEAN exporters. The AFTA 
RoO underwent further overhaul starting in 2003, when operational procedures were 
                                                 
 
10 There are certain operations that have been identified by both countries as insufficient working or 
processing, even if a change of heading takes place These are typically simple operations like labeling, 
packaging or assembly of parts.  
  8further clarified and simplified. In the same year, a decision was reached to adopt a 
change in tariff heading rule for determining product origin as a general alternative 
rule “applicable to all products which cannot comply with the 40% local/ASEAN 
content requirement, giving priority to sectors which are the subject of private sector 
requests and those sectors prioritized by the AEM for accelerated integration” (AFTA 
Council, 2003)
11. As of last year, the change of tariff heading rule is fully endorsed 
for four sectors: wheat-flour, wood-based products, aluminum products and iron and 
steel.  
 
Table 2: RoO in Major Asia-Pacific BTAs and RTAs 








BTAs/RTAs       
India  -Thailand  Yes, 4, 6 digit 
level product 
specific# 




India – Sri Lanka  Yes  (or  VA)  4 
digit level 
--  35% F.O.B. Value  Bilateral 
Singapore - Japan  Yes  (or  VA)  4 
digit level 
Yes  60% F.O.B. value  Bilateral 
Asia-Pacific 
Trade Agreement 













40% F.O.B. value  Full 
SAARC  No tariff heading 
change necessary 
--  40% (30% for 
LDC) 
Diagonal 




--  40% F.O.B. value  Full 
*ASEAN and China have completed product specific rules for a few sectors such as textile, footwear, 
iron & steel etc.  
# In case of the India-Thailand agreement, both RVC and CTC criteria are used.  
$ The current AFTA also provides the advantage of product specific rules. But it does not include all 
products.  
Source: Updated from the original in “Asia-Pacific Regionalism Quo Vadis? Charting the Territory for 
New Integration Routes,” Bonapace Tiziana & Mia Micic (2007), UNESCAP. 
 
 
                                                 
 
11 In November 2004, 11 priority sectors were identified for deeper integration; for these sectors, tariffs 
will be eliminated in 2007 for at least 85% of the products for ASEAN-6, and in 2012 for Cambodia, 
Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam. These sectors are: agro-based products, automotive products, electronics, 
fisheries, rubber-based products, textiles & apparels, wood-based products, e-ASEAN, health care, 
tourism and air travel. AFTA Council. http://www.aseansec.org/15070.htm   
  9China and ASEAN began talks on a free trade accord in early 2002 and signed a 
framework agreement in November, which contained general goals for the bilateral 
FTA between ASEAN and China. In the agreement, both parties agreed to work faster 
toward a free trade agreement on market access for commodities in 2004 which was 
implemented in July 2005. The agreement reduced bilateral tariffs, which should be 
down to zero for most products by 2010. According to Article 3 (4) of the ASEAN-
China FTA framework agreement, the products which are subject to the tariff 
reduction or elimination program shall be categorized into two Tracks as follows: 
Normal Track and Sensitive Track. For products listed in the Normal Track, MFN 
tariff rates were gradually reduced or eliminated over the period from July 1, 2005 to 
2012 for ASEAN 6 and China, and in the case of the new ASEAN Member States, 
from July 1, 2005 to 2018 with higher starting tariff rates and different staging. 
ASEAN 6 and China can not have more than 400 HS6 tariff lines, while the sensitive 
track items for new member countries can not exceed 500 items (HS6). The sensitive 
track items will be categorized into two groups: Sensitive List items and Highly 
Sensitive List items. A maximum 40% of sensitive track items may be listed as highly 
sensitive goods. Since the ASEAN-China FTA involves 11 countries and special 
considerations were made in determining tariff elimination concessions, the 
appendices of tariff elimination are quite complicated. However, small numbers of 
items, which are listed as highly sensitive, will have their tariffs reduced to not higher 
than 50% not later than January 1, 2015 for ASEAN 6 and China, and January 1, 2018 
for the newer ASEAN member countries.  
 
The ASEAN-China FTA adopts the same general value-added rule used in the AFTA: 
40% local/regional content with full cumulation. The Agreement on Trade in Goods 
extends the liberalization commitments from the limited ‘Early-Harvest’ agricultural 
products (HS chapter 01 – 08), to the rest of the traded sectors in the normal inclusion 
list. As in the AFTA RoO, an alternative change of tariff heading criteria can be 
invoked for a number of products.6 In the case of ACTFA, the rule applies for 424 
(HS6) textiles and textile products, 2 items of preserved fish, 6 items of wool, 22 of 
leather goods, 14 for fur skins and 4 item lines of footwear. It is only in 5 wool tariff 
items that the change of tariff heading is set as the exclusive rule
12.  
For Singapore FTAs, such as the one concluded with Japan (JSEPA), the degree of 
restrictiveness of the RoO largely reflects the sensitivities of Singapore’s partners. 
Agricultural products, textiles and apparel are characterized by particularly complex 
rules even though 384 agricultural items are excluded, constituting 90% of total 
Singapore exports to Japan. RoOs are product specific, relying mostly on the change 
of tariff heading rule
13. For some products an alternative RVC rule is allowed, albeit 
at a high rate of 60%. In cases where RVC is an additional criterion to be satisfied, the 
content requirement is lower, at 40%. It is important to consider why this is the case, 
as it matters for the design and interpretation of the restrictiveness index more 
generally.  When an RVC requirement is added to a CTC requirement, there is already 
                                                 
 
12 Attachment B of the ASEAN-China FTA Agreement 
(http://app.fta.gov.sg/data//fta/file/ACFTA_Annex3.pdf ) 
13 Heading changes are needed for HS 01- 24, HS 38 (chemical products), HS 85 (machinery), while 
subheading or value content requirements apply for liquor and cordials. For the rest a RVC requirement 
of 60% with a combination of subheading changes is required. The yarn-forward rule applies for textile 
fabrics and articles (HS 59). 
  10some value added inherent in the compliance with the CTC, but it is uncertain how 
much value that might be.  Thus, the marginal cost to producers of complying with 
the RVC, having already met the CTC, is much lower than meeting the RVC 
independently.  Alternatively we can say that the process of adding value in the 
production of a good is likely to result in some change of classification, and so the 
marginal cost of meeting the change specified in the rule, conditional on having met 
the RVC requirement, is lower.  In general, one observes that when CTC and RVC 
criteria are combined, the level of each is lower (e.g. change of heading instead of 
change of chapter, and lower percentage requirement on originating content).  For 
example, ASEAN uses CTC for a very small number of products, and not at all in its 
agreements with China and Korea. The EU’s regimes utilize a fairly even split 
between change of heading and non-CTC rules. 
 
However, about half of the tariff subheadings in the agreement already have duty-free 
MFN status, so that in practice, RoOs’ effect is quite limited. De minimis is permitted, 
also varying across products.  The Singaporean agreements allow the value of the 
materials exported from Singapore for further processing to be considered as 
originating, despite the processing that occurred outside Singapore.  The value added 
by processing outside Singapore does not count as originating. Outward processing is 
really a provision for flexibility in Direct Shipment, not a form of extended 
cumulation. The SAFTA includes Change in tariff heading as a qualifying criterion, 
and the value content needs to be at least 40 per cent for India and Pakistan, 35 per 
cent for Sri Lanka and 30 per cent for least developed countries. Cumulation is 
diagonal. On September 1, 2004, Thailand and India entered into an FTA reducing 
MFN rates by 50% for 82 commodity items and lowering other rates by 75% by 2005 
and 100% by 2006. These goods span a wide range, from tropical fruits and 
polycarbonates to other appliances like fans, refrigerators, televisions and automobile 
parts. The rules of origin for this EHP excepts those tropical fruits and seafood to 
which the wholly obtained standard applies, requiring in almost all cases that two 
standards-a change of 4-digit or 6-digit tariff codes and a local procurement of 40% or 
greater-be simultaneously satisfied. Thus India-Thailand RoO are stricter than AFTA 
rules, and goods cleared under AFTA’s CEPT rule cannot be used under the India-
Thailand FTA. In this case domestic value addition in Thailand alone has to meet a 
minimum of 40%.  
 
Results from index calculations show the variation in restrictiveness of origin rules 
across PTAs. They suggest that the restrictiveness of RoO is low to moderate. They 
also suggest that the most restrictive rules tend to be associated with regimes that 
adopt multiple criteria for determining origin, more restrictive variants of individual 
criteria and product specific rules, particularly in areas otherwise supported by higher 
tariffs. For example, in case of the Japan-Singapore agreement, the restrictiveness is 
quite high as indicated in Appendix 1. If we take a closer look we see that the primary 
criteria for determining the restrictiveness of the rules of origin is quite high 
compared to other agreements like SAARC or China-ASEAN. This has an overall 
impact on the restrictiveness index as observed in the figure below. AFTA and the 
ASEAN-China FTA have similar types of rules, but supplementary criteria are more 
stringent in case of the ASEAN-China FTA, making its overall restrictiveness slightly 
higher. In case of SAARC, the primary criteria are stringent but the supplementary 
criteria for calculating restrictiveness results in a lower figure. SAARC’s rules are 
simple and also provide differential treatment to LDCs and Sri Lanka.  
































Source: Authors’ calculation 
Note: Select operational FTAs till 2009 have been considered 
 
 
5.  Intra-Industry Trade Index and Results  
 
To better understand the trade in the selected sectors, an attempt has been made to 
calculate the intra-industry trade index (IIT) following the Grubel-Lloyd method. The 
index values lie between 0 and 1. The value indicates the extent of the bilateral trade 
in similar products. We assume that when a component crosses the border for value 
addition, the HS code of the product at the disaggregated level may get changed while 
remaining within the same product category. A Higher IIT provides a signal for the 
existence of IPN among trading nations. In this section, we have divided all 6-digit 
HS codes into a few broader categories.  A group IIT
14 has been calculated by 
considering the reporter country’s exports and imports with its selected trade partners. 
IIT figures of 2004 and 2008 are shown in the tables (tables 3-8) to illustrate whether 
intra-industry trade has increased over the years in these selected industries. IIT is 
calculated from the data of reporting countries.  
 
Table 3 indicates that for integrated circuits, high IITs are visible within ASEAN, 
between Japan and Singapore, ASEAN and Japan, and China and Singapore. ASEAN 
does not have many linkages with South Asia including India in this particular sector. 
China has very high IIT with Singapore, followed by India. It is important to note that 
China is linked to Singapore through the China-ASEAN FTA and APEC, but with 
India there it has no trade agreement. China-Japan’s IIT is also quite low. India is 
outside the IPN of electronic goods which is spread across East and Southeast Asia. 
However, within the SAARC region, integration is increasing. One might expect that 
the India-ASEAN FTA will give boost to IIT among these countries.  
                                                 
 
14 Following formula is used to arrive at the group level IIT, based on N observations (6-digit level 












































GL: Grubel Lloyd Index 
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Table 3: IIT for Select FTAs: Sector-wise Comparative Results (2004 & 2008) 
Textile  Auto-parts 
Integrated 
Circuits  Sl. No  Blocs 
2004  2008  2004  2008  2004  2008 
1 ASEAN  -  ASEAN  0.90 0.83 0.76 0.84 0.98 0.93 
2 ASEAN  -  China  0.40 0.89 0.68 0.51 0.54 0.54 
3 ASEAN  -  India  0.50 0.49 0.52 0.49 0.04 0.06 
4 ASEAN  -  Japan  0.72 0.75 0.32 0.41 0.74 0.87 
5 ASEAN  -  SAARC  0.85 0.89 0.34 0.37 0.05 0.07 
6 ASEAN  -  Singapore  0.46 0.71 0.94 0.92 0.81 0.90 
7 ASEAN  -  Thailand  0.57 0.74 0.86 0.62 0.87 0.87 
8 China  -  India  0.60 0.69 0.88 0.16 0.53 0.54 
9 China  -  Japan  0.41 0.96 0.42 0.58 0.21 0.19 
10 China  -  SAARC  0.63 0.97 0.31 0.11 0.52 0.43 
11 China  -  Singapore  0.08 0.96 0.89 0.59 0.55 0.92 
12 China  -  Thailand  0.92 0.98 0.89 0.43 0.11 0.07 
13 India  -  Japan  0.38 0.49 0.10 0.10 0.01 0.02 
14 India  -  SAARC  0.28 0.27 0.01 0.05 0.52 0.04 
15 India  -  Singapore  0.14 0.23 0.47 0.55 0.03 0.29 
16 India-  Thailand  0.81 0.98 0.36 0.38 0.03 0.03 
17 Japan  -  SAARC  0.46 0.46 0.05 0.10 0.13 0.03 
18 Japan  -  Thailand  0.72 0.78 0.30 0.43 0.41 0.34 
19 SAARC  -  SAARC  0.86 0.59 0.45 0.45 0.58 0.88 
20 SAARC  -  Singapore  0.60 0.65 0.50 0.72 0.03 0.26 
21 SAARC  -  Thailand  0.52 0.77 0.28 0.31 0.03 0.03 
22 Singapore-Japan  0.15 0.05 0.18 0.21 0.99 0.77 
23 Singapore  -  Thailand  0.61 0.82 0.54 0.85 0.75 0.81 
Note: The reporter country is listed first, e.g. for China-India, China’s export and import data with India was considered.  
Source: Calculated from WITS 
 
In case of auto components, ASEAN’s intra-regional IIT increased between 2004 and 
2008.  Singapore and Thailand played a leading role. Apart from this, high IIT is 
observed between Singapore and China. Between India and Singapore, China and 
Japan, and ASEAN and India, IIT is at a moderate level.  A large drop in IIT between 
China and India and China and Thailand was observed from 2004 to 2008. Trade 
between Japan and ASEAN is mainly in full vehicles and sophisticated components; 
as a result IIT is comparatively low in the aggregate for components.  From Japan’s 
perspective, IIT in auto component sectors has increased with China, Thailand and 
ASEAN in general. 
 
For textiles, ASEAN has very high IIT with ASEAN members, SAARC, Japan, and 
China.  ASEAN’s IIT with India is only 0.49, which implies that its relationship with 
Bangladesh and Sri Lanka in textiles is more integrated. .The remarkable increase of 
ASEAN’s IIT with China from 2004-2008 is also noteworthy. The textile IIT is 
moderately high between India and China, as China buys raw materials such as cotton 
and yarn from India and in return sells India some of the final goods. This integration 
demonstrates an increasing trend. The same is true for SAARC-China relations. From 
India’s perspective, its IIT with ASEAN as a whole is declining rising with Thailand. 
Thailand’s IIT with Singapore has also increased in recent times. Comparing the 
integration of India and China, it is clear that China’s IIT has increased remarkably 
  13with most partners while India’s has not. SAARC in general has lower IITs with East 
and South East Asian countries other than China. Interestingly, within SAARC IIT 
declined between 2004 and 2008.  
 
A simple exercise shows that the RoO restrictiveness index is negatively correlated 
with changes in the IIT index for the selected three sectors. This implies that when the 




Table 4: Correlation between the Change in IIT index &  
RoO Restrictiveness Index 
Sectors Values 
Textile -0.16 
Integrated Circuit  -0.22 
Auto Components  -0.16 
Note: Calculated from 15 restrictiveness indexes in Appendix 3 
 
 
However, change in IIT depends more on the growth of exports in that sector, and the 
level of already existing IITs in 2004. A regression analysis reflects that in auto 
components and integrated circuits, RoO restrictiveness hampered the growth of IIT 
between 2004 and 2008. However, the values are not statistically significant. 
However, in the textile sector, intra-industry trade growth has surpassed the 
restrictiveness posed by RoO barriers mainly because of the huge growth in trade 
between ASEAN members and China.  As a result, the regression coefficient of the 
restrictiveness index for the textile industry turns out to be positive. Hence, it may be 
argued that though prima facie RoO has an impact on intra industry trade, its degree 
depends on other variables as well. The regression results show that though the 
restrictiveness index produces expected results in two out of three cases, none of them 
are significant. The result is given in Table 5. 
 
Table 5: Regression Results 
Dependent Variable  IIT value in 2008  IIT value in 2008  IIT value in 2008 
Independent Variable  Auto Components   Integrated  Circuits  Textiles 
Constant   0.313192*  0.074506   0.419822
IIT value for 2004   0.711889*  0.929151*   0.524532
Export growth between 2004-08  -0.000502*  0.000263  -0.000465
RoO Restrictiveness Index  -0.346489 -0.130149   0.132928
R-Sq 0.70  0.71  0.22 






















  146.  Import Growth and Tariff Reduction in the selected Sectors 
 
This section describes in brief import growth and change in tariffs among selected 
trade blocs and trade partners with respect to the three sectors identified. Table 6 
provides information on this. It is observed that tariffs are already at very low levels 
for electronics and integrated circuits. The trade volume among ASEAN countries is 
quite significant. However, in terms of growth rate, ASEAN-China and ASEAN-India 
are quite promising. In the auto components sector, trade between ASEAN and China 
is growing, as is also the case with India. Within ASEAN, trade is also substantial and 
tariff rates lower when compared to other trade partners. In contrast to electronics and 
integrated circuits, we observe that the growth rate in intra-ASEAN trade in auto-parts 
is quite high. In textiles, the average growth rate is relatively lower compared to other 
two sectors and so is the volume of imports. The maximum trade is visible among 
ASEAN and China. It is important to note that in general tariff rates are higher for 
textiles compared to auto-parts and integrated circuits. Table 6 shows features of the 
trade dynamics in the selected sectors among selected trade partners. It is visible that 
trade between ASEAN members and China is more integrated than with SAARC 
countries. In this context India’s growing links with ASEAN are noticeable.
15 
 
Table 6: Growth Rates for Imports of Select Trade Blocs across Sectors 
(Import growth values from 2004 and 2008 are considered) 
 















Select Trade Blocs  ($ '000)  (%)  (%)  ($ '000)  (%)  (%)  ($ '000)  (%)  (%) 
ASEAN - ASEAN  2,545,599 12  7.42  5,620,119  153  8.81 21,347,068  4  0.95 
ASEAN - China  4,068,580 28 11.48  1,389,665  148  10.17 5,330,720 107  0.79 
ASEAN - India  603,339 57 12.63  200,089  197  12.5  21,081  130 2.5 
ASEAN - SAARC  832,663 25 14.24  202,871  187 16.18 25,130  153 5.4 
ASEAN - Singapore  235,932 83 7.42  608,398 165  8.81  4,956,510 13  0.95 
ASEAN - Thailand  486,809 2 7.42  2,749,917 183  8.81  1,834,902 14  0.95 
China - India  1,375,429  200  12.69  57,524 59 12.50 34,300 305 2.5 
India- Thailand  107,377 68 21.29  279,669  290 14.34  5,195  -43  2.5 
Japan – Singapore  2,523 -61  6.86  24,086 19  0.39  1,303,362  15  0 
Note: Tariff data calculated as weighted average of product group from TRAINS 








                                                 
 
15 Some obvious relationships such as Japan’s trade with ASEAN in auto parts and electronic goods 
have not been shown here as the trade relationship is already very mature.  
  157.  Rules of origin, Trade Growth and the Potential for Regional 
Production Networks 
 
With the fragmentation of world trade it is very difficult to ascertain sources of goods 
as there is no single correct definition of origin. (La Nasa 1995) This being so, apart 
from the harmonization efforts of the WTO, several initiatives have been taken by 
different regional groupings if only to agree on a system beneficial to all. These RTAs 
and FTAs are expected to improve trade creation, reducing trade distortion. 
Sometimes, liberalization commitments in RTAs and FTAs go beyond WTO 
commitments in certain areas. The objective obviously remains unfulfilled in others:  
 
 (a) The RoO should be simple but precise, transparent and to the extent possible, 
predictable and stable. 
(b) RoO should be designed to have the least trade distorting impact and should not 
become a disguised non-tariff barrier to trade. 
(c) As much as possible, the rules should be consistent across products and across 
agreements. The greater the inconsistencies, the greater the complexity of the system 
of ROO both for companies and for officials administering the various trade schemes. 
(Brenton, 2003). However, consistency of rules across products and agreements 
would make the analysis easier and would increase transparency for those not familiar 
with production processes and the availability of cost-competitive materials within a 
given cumulation zone. This being said, imposed harmonization would likely have 
unintended and undesirable consequences.  A harmonized RVC requirement would 
leave producers exposed to fluctuations in international commodity prices and 
exchange rates, and a harmonized CTC requirement would not account for the fact 
that the Harmonized System is not, and never has been, designed to be used for 
definition of rules of origin.  A change of heading requirement has a very different 
implications for cost structures in the production of live animals (Chapter 01) than it 
does for shirts (chapters 61-62), refrigerators (chapter 84), or automobiles (Chapter 
87).  Imposing artificial simplicity on a complex system will not work.  
 
Most of these propositions are actually the same as the basic principles enunciated in 
the WTO RoO. However, in practice, a country will tend to suit its FTA to serve the 
different purposes it might have in dealing with its FTA partners. Negotiations 
themselves are mainly politically motivated and so the coverage of each trade 
agreement is expected to be different as well as their governing rules. As much as 
there is the need for simplicity and flexibility, the efficacy of these rules against rent-
seekers should not be compromised. In reality, it has been observed that the burden of 
stricter RoO affects large, small and medium sized firms as well as firms from low-
income countries, as they are unable to satisfy all the clauses laid down by the laws. 
Recent study by Kawai and Wignaraja at the ADBI found that large multinationals 
report more difficulty with RoO than smaller firms in surveys. Larger firms have 
more negative perceptions of multiple RoOs than SMEs, probably because large firms 
tend to export to multiple markets and are more likely to complain about issues 
stemming from multiple RoOs. In contrast, smaller firms tend to export to single 
markets.  This makes sense in that larger firms should tend to trade large numbers of 
products and have more complicated and longer supply chains.  However, as a 
counter argument we should mention that there may be cases where SMEs are more 
  16hurt since they do not supply to many players and are more directly affected by RoO, 
than MNCs. Also, in a competitive world, SMEs do business on small margins and 
low volume. The stricter value addition criteria of RoO or CTH thus definitely affect 
SMEs.  
 
In this section we juxtapose trade growth in the identified sectors with changes in IIT, 
tariff liberalization and restrictiveness of respective RoO. By doing so, we seek to 
gauge the probable role of RoO in promoting international production networks in the 
region. As mentioned earlier, trade in components, parts and semi-finished goods 
comprises a major portion of intra-regional trade in Asia-Pacific.  As components are 
mostly of low value products, simplification of RoO would promote growth of the 




IIT figures for integrated circuits are quite impressive within ASEAN. Apart from 
this, it is also high between Singapore and Japan but declined during the period 2004-
08. It increased for ASEAN-Japan and China-Singapore. IIT is at a moderate level in 
case of ASEAN-China and China-India, and is at very low level for ASEAN-India, 
India-Japan, and ASEAN-SAARC.  
 
Correspondingly, we have noticed that restrictiveness is quite low for AFTA 
compared to other important agreements such as the ASEAN-China FTA or the 
Japan-Singapore FTA (JSFTA). Under AFTA some electronic products fall under 
product specific rules and thereby take advantage of the situation. For electronic 
goods, change of tariff heading is allowed at the six digit level. Trade in these goods 
is promoted via this route despite having lower value addition. On the contrary, 
JSFTA is quite stringent as the value addition criteria is quite high (60%) and change 
of tariff heading is allowed only at the 4 digit level. Moreover, supplementary criteria 
are more prohibitive in comparison to ASEAN, as there are conditions beyond 
cumulation.  On the other hand, the ASEAN-China FTA started only with an Early 
Harvest Scheme covering agricultural goods. Later on, RoO which primarily used 
AFTA type regulations were also adopted. However, its product specific rules in 
terms of CTH are limited to only few sectors which do not include electronic goods. 
The India-Thailand Bilateral agreement is operational for only 82 Early Harvest 
scheme products. Its RoO are quite stringent as products must clear both RVC and 
CTH parameters. Hence, the agreement has not been used extensively for electronic 
goods. 
 
The trade scenario shows that the highest amount of intra-regional imports of 
integrated circuits occurred within ASEAN, followed by ASEAN-China and Japan-
Singapore. The key issue is that the tariff rate is zero for integrated circuits imported 
in Japan from Singapore, where as it is 0.95% within ASEAN. Hence, we can 
conclude that within ASEAN, favorable RoO promote intra-regional trade, while for 
Japan-Singapore, trade is more influenced by the zero tariff rate as the RoO is quite 
restrictive. Between ASEAN and China, trade is promoted by the combined effect of 
low tariffs and relatively less restrictive RoO. Only the lack of a CTH rule for 
integrated circuits is hampering deeper trade relations at the B2B level in this sector. 
South Asia in general and India in particular is still outside of this production 
network.  
  17Auto Components 
 
In the auto-components sector, trade is substantially governed by the tariff rates. Most 
of the selected countries still have higher tariff rates, except for countries like Japan. 
ASEAN and China maintain moderate tariff levels. India and Thailand have relatively 
higher tariffs.  
 
Analyzing IIT figures, we found that intra-industry trade was promoted within the 
ASEAN region. However, the same has declined for Thailand which implies that 
intra-industry trade increased among other ASEAN members significantly in recent 
times. From Thailand’s point of view, its integration with Singapore increased 
compared to other ASEAN members. ASEAN’s IIT with China declined, while the 
IIT between India and Thailand was flat. China’s integration in the auto-component 
sector with Japan and Singapore, and other partners remained moderate. It dropped 
substantially for India, Singapore, and Thailand.  
 
Consequently, we can conclude that despite lower tariff rates between Japan and 
Singapore, overall trade and IIT in auto components did not increase between these 
countries, perhaps due to stringent RoO. Low-value products could not reach the level 
of 60% value addition or CTH for the 4-digit classification. On the other hand, trade 
is growing fast among ASEAN countries despite relatively higher tariff rates (see 
Table 4). One of the reasons for this could be simpler and less restrictive RoO. Auto-
components enjoy the benefit of the CTH rule at the six digit level. However, despite 
having similar RVC, in ASEAN-China RoO overall IIT declined due to higher tariff 
rates and the absence of product specific CTH. These two factors can act as severe 
barriers to low value auto components. India’s integration with ASEAN and China is 
still at low levels. As with Thailand, only Early Harvest products are under operation. 
With ASEAN, the FTA has just become operational, and with China there is no trade 





For textiles, tariff rates are relatively higher compared to the sectors mentioned above. 
Trade between ASEAN and China is quite significant, as is also the case between 
China and India and within ASEAN. Japan and Singapore do not have a comparative 
advantage in these products and hence trade volume between them is quite low.  
 
Intra-industry trade is here mainly promoted by the complementarity of raw materials, 
differences in skills and product design, and economies of scale. This is due to the 
fact that wage costs in most of these countries are quite low except in countries like 
Japan and Singapore. High IIT was observed between ASEAN and SAARC, ASEAN 
and China, and India and Thailand. Interestingly, all blocs studied showed higher 
restrictiveness indexes. This implies that despite higher RoO restrictiveness, IITs and 
intra-industry trade among these countries still had higher values. On this basis we 
can argue that benefits derived from complementarity in resources and economies of 
production outweigh the negative impacts of restrictive RoO in the textile sector. Also 
                                                 
 
16 See more in “Fighting Irrelevance: Fighting irrelevance: The role of regional trade agreements in 
international production networks” (A Study of ARTNeT) ESCAP 2011 
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both AFTA and ASEAN-China have similar kinds of product specific rules for 
textiles. In sum, the effects of trade promotion are highly visible within ASEAN and 
between ASEAN and China, which is reflected in Table 4.  
 
8.  Conclusion 
 
In summary, we can say that in the integrated circuits sector, RoO along with very 
low tariff levels play an important role in the flourishing intra-industry trade, 
particularly within the ASEAN region. Favorable RoO promoted IPN growth within 
ASEAN, but in case of Japan and Singapore, the free trade regime characterized by 
lower tariff rates was more influential.  Between ASEAN and China a lack of CTH 
played a negative role. In auto-parts, ASEAN enjoyed the benefit of less restrictive 
RoO in terms of RVC and CTH at the 6-digit level, compared to Japan-Singapore 
which has higher RVC and CTH at the 4-digit level. For ASEAN-China, higher tariff 
rates and the lack of CTH provisions created a barrier for low value auto components. 
In the textile sector, complementarity in resources and economies of production 
worked as a stronger variable to promote intra-industry trade among countries in 
which RoO restrictiveness is higher, such as ASEAN-China and India-Thailand. IIT 
was high even in blocs where there are no formal trade agreements, such as between 
China and India, ASEAN and SAARC, and China and SAARC. However, both 
AFTA and ASEAN-China have similar kinds of product specific CTH rules for 
textiles, which are quite less restrictive. The textile trade is promoted within ASEAN 
and between ASEAN and China through a business friendly RoO regime.  
 
We conclude this study by highlighting the fact that RoO does play a significant role 
in promoting IPN. Apart from the RVC criteria, CTH criteria at the 6-digit level is 
more helpful in promoting trade in low value components. So although tariff 
reduction is the most important tool for making a trade agreement work efficiently, 
simpler RoO with product specific rules can act as a catalyst even if tariff rates are not 
so low. We also note through the regression analysis that a higher RoO restrictiveness 
index inhibits the positive growth of intra-industry trade.  
 
RoO have a significant impact on strategic planning, since the importance of IPNs is 
well-recognized and some agreements have been made to encourage and promote 
their development. The ASEAN Industrial Cooperation Scheme (AICO) encourages 
technology investments in the ASEAN area by reducing tariffs on goods produced by 
companies partially owned by ASEAN citizens (30% equity), incorporated and 
operating in member countries and cooperating or sharing resources (such as sharing 
technology or consolidating raw materials purchases) with another company in the 
region. (ADB 2002). RoO should be supportive of the expansion and development of 
these initiatives. Favorable RoO should be able to exploit the sectoral exceptions in 













Thailand  APTA 
PRIMARY CRITERIA           
Change in tariff classification  0  0  0  0.1 0.1 0 
Regional value content or percentage criterion            
   Percentage of originating material  0.04 0.04  0.04 0.08  0.02  0.04 
   Formulation of regional value content  0.006 0.012  0.006 0.006  0.006  0.006 
   Elements of production costs for domestic content  0.001 0.006  0 0  0  0.001 
   Treatment of DMRM   0.01 0  0.02 0.02  0.02  0.01 
   Methods of qualifying production costs  0.005 0.02  0.005 0.005  0.005  0.005 
   Valuation of non-originating material  0.015 0.015  0.01 0.01  0.01  0.015 
Specified manufacturing process test  0  0  0  0.05 0.05 0 
Sector-specific rules  0  0  0 0  0  0 
Subtotal  0.077 0.093  0.081 0.271  0.211  0.077 
SUPPLEMENTARY CRITERIA           
   Type of cumulation  0.03 0.03  0.02 0.03  0.03  0.02 
   Provisions that go beyond cumulation  0.005 0.005  0.05 0.05  0.05  0.005 
   Duty drawback   0 0  0.05 0.05  0.05 0 
   Territoriality or outward processing  0.05 0  0.05 0.05  0.05  0.05 
   Geographic location of manufacturing process  0.025 0  0.05 0.05  0.05  0.025 
Subtotal 0.11  0.035  0.22 0.23  0.23  0.1 
Other Effects of RoO           
   Degree of certainty  0.05 0.05  0.05 0.05  0.05  0.05 
   Compliance and administration costs  0.025 0.025  0.025 0.025  0.025  0.025 
   Rigidity  0.05 0.025  0.05 0.05  0.05  0.05 
Subtotal 0.125  0.1  0.125 0.125  0.125  0.125 
GRAND TOTAL  0.312  0.228  0.426  0.626  0.566  0.302 
Source: Author’s Calculation based on different Agreements
  20Appendix 2: Rationale for RoO Restrictiveness Index 
Weight  Score  Restriction category  Rationale for provision 
PRIMARY CRITERIA 
0.2   Change in tariff classification 
  0  Tariff item (HS 8-digit) 
  0.2  Sub-heading (HS 6-digit) 
  0.5  Heading (HS 4-digit) 
  1  Chapter (HS 2-digit) 
 
The CTC method can be applied at different levels in the HS. A change in tariff classification at the broad (2-
digit) chapter level provides the highest hurdle for conferring origin and is therefore given the highest 
restrictiveness score of one. Progressively lower scores are assigned to the heading (4-digit), sub-heading (6-
digit) and tariff item (8-digit) levels. 
0.1   Regional value content or percentage criterion 
    Percentage of originating material 17 
  0  Less than 25% 
 0.2  26-35% 
 0.4  36-45% 
 0.6  46-55% 
 0.8  56-65% 
  1  More than 65% 
 
The pivotal sub-criterion for the application of the DVA method is the threshold percentage adopted, 
expressed as either a minimum percentage of value that must have been added in the PTA region, or a 
maximum percentage of import value from non-member economies allowed. This sub-category takes the 
highest weight of 0.1. The remaining five sub-criteria are given an equal weight of 0.02 each. The rule used in 
assessing restrictiveness in the percentage criterion is unambiguous. The higher the percentage of originating 
material required, the higher the restrictiveness score. 
0.02    Formulation of regional value content 
 0  Any  method 
 0.3  Import  content 
 0.6  Domestic  content 
  1  Value of parts 
 
The percentage of originating and non-originating materials can be formulated in three different ways: value 
of parts, domestic content and import content. Wherever the value of parts test is used, it is assessed as the 
most restrictive of the alternatives because it focuses on a very small set of either local or non-local material 
inputs. Formulation of the percentage criterion based on domestic content is considered to be more restrictive 
than a specification based on the imported content because it is considered to facilitate manipulation and to 
add to compliance and administration costs. 
0.02    Elements of production costs for domestic content 
  0  All costs included 
  0.1  Taxes and duties paid on materials excluded 
  0.2  Indirect labor also excluded 
 
Typically, the narrower the range of qualifying expenditures relative to total costs, the harder it is for a 
firm to reach the origin threshold, meaning the origin rule is more restrictive. Accordingly, RoO which count 
fewer expenditure items as qualifying are considered to be more restrictive and are assigned a higher score. 
                                                 
 
17 Agreements applying regional content thresholds to confer origin can use different valuation methods. To improve comparability of thresholds in alternate agreements, the 
thresholds have been normalised to a factory cost basis.  
  21   0.3  Other capital costs also excluded 
  0.4  Inner containers also excluded 
  0.5  Other packaging expenses also excluded 
  0.7  Selling, general and administrative expenses also 
excluded 
  1  Profits also excluded 
0.02    Treatment of determined manufactured raw materials
  0  Imports from all zero tariff line items to member 
economies are treated as eligible expenditures 
  0.5  Imports from selected zero tariff line items to 
member economies are treated as eligible 
expenditures 
  1  No provision for allowing DMRM in calculating 
domestic content 
 
Determined manufactured raw materials (DMRM) provisions allow certain materials of third country origin 
that are not manufactured in either partner economy to be defined as ‘manufactured raw materials’ and treated 
as qualifying expenditures for the determination of origin. The inclusion of DMRM provisions in a trade 
agreement tends to have a liberalizing effect. Thus, origin rules without such provisions are treated as more 
restrictive than rules that allow the inclusion of certain materials from third countries. 
0.02    Methods of qualifying production costs 
  0 Any  method 
  0.25 Transaction  value  method 
  0.5 Net  cost  method 
 1  Factory  cost  method 
 
Of the DVA methods applied, the factory cost method is typically considered to have the narrowest cost base 
(since it focuses on the manufacturing aspect of the production and distribution chain), affording the least 
flexibility to businesses in making their input choices. It is also administratively more complicated. This 
method is treated as most restrictive. In contrast, the transaction value method is typically considered to have 
the widest cost base (since it focuses on transaction values, typically including transport and distribution 
costs), affording the most flexibility to firms in making their input choices. 
 
0.02    Valuation of non-originating materials 
  0  Not relevant or unspecified 
  0.25  Free into store (fis) 
  0.5  Cost, insurance and freight (cif) 
  0.75  Free on board (fob) 
 1  Ex-factory  cost 
 
An ‘ex-factory’ cost basis is considered to be the narrowest valuation basis and origin rules incorporating this 
provision are treated as the most restrictive on this account. Less restrictive valuation bases, in order of 
restrictiveness, include free on board at port of embarkation (fob), cost insurance and freight at port of 
unloading (cif) and free into store (fis). 
0.1    Type of specified manufacturing process test applied
 0  No  test 
  0.5  Positive test for specific process 
 
The inclusion of specific process tests adds to the restrictiveness of origin rules. Such tests typically are 
specified in terms of particular industrial processes and ways of working, limiting the prospect for 
  22   1  Negative test for specific process  technological or organizational change and productivity improvement. Variants of the method prescribed at 
the outset certain production or sourcing requirements that must be met — termed the positive test — or must 
not be evident — the negative test — to confer origin. The negative test is treated as being more restrictive, as 
it may indiscriminately and unintentionally exclude products on the basis of a particular product characteristic 
rather than the characteristics of the full production process.  
 
0.1   Sector-specific rules 
  0  All sectors treated uniformly 
  0.5  Single manufacturing sector only 
 1  Multiple  sectors   
 
The presence of sector-specific rules for more than one sector is treated as the most restrictive variant. RoO 
including sector-specific rules for only one manufacturing sector (the less common case) are treated as 
moderately restrictive.  
SUPPLEMENTARY CRITERIA 
0.05   Type of cumulation 
 0  All 
 0.2  Diagonal 
 0.4  Full 
 0.6  Bilateral 
 1  No  cumulation 
 
Origin rules that involve no cumulation in the valuation of regional content are treated as being the most 
restrictive, and rules allowing bilateral cumulation are treated as more restrictive than methods involving full 
or diagonal cumulation. Diagonal cumulation is treated as least restrictive on the grounds that it allows 
specified materials from non-member countries to be counted as qualifying materials. 
0.05   Provisions that go beyond cumulation 
 0  Cumulation  allowed 
 0.1  Tolerance  or  de minimis allowed 
 0.25  Absorption  principle 
 0.5  Tracing  test 
  1  Absorption principle, tracing and tolerance tests not 
used 
 
Some provisions in PTAs go beyond cumulation in allowing origin of non-members’ materials. For any 
cumulation method, detailed testing of the source of inputs can influence the restrictiveness of the origin rules. 
Of the alternatives, tracing tests are treated as the least liberalizing because they restrict valuations to include 
only originating materials. By contrast, under the absorption principle, the full value of the material input is 
given originating status if an initial test is satisfied. Tolerance tests are treated as the most liberal of the 
options because they are regarded as providing the greatest scope for raising the level of ‘originating’ content. 
 
0.05   Duty drawback 
 0  Drawback  allowed 
  1  Drawback not allowed 
 
Duty drawback schemes allow tariffs due on imported materials used in the production of export items to be 
waived or refunded. Such schemes selectively lower the cost of inputs used to produce goods for export. In 
origin rules, access to drawback provisions generally available to exporters can be restricted or denied entirely, 
raising the cost of exporting to member economies and encouraging firms to purchase inputs from potentially 
higher-cost local sources. Origin rules that disallow or derogate drawback arrangements for exporters are 
treated as more restrictive than rules that do not. 
 
  23 0.05   Territoriality or outward processing 
  0  Territoriality or outward processing included 
  1  Territoriality or outward processing excluded 
 
Territoriality provisions go beyond the cumulation provisions in PTAs in allowing the use of materials from 
non-member countries. However, this is treated as a separate item in the index because of its importance in 
modern industrial manufacturing and organization (e.g. through contracting-out and commission work). Origin 
rules that limit or disallow the conferring of origin on goods produced using outsourcing and outward 
processing arrangements are treated as more restrictive than rules that do not. 
 
0.05   Geographic location of manufacturing process 
  0  Anywhere or not specified 
  0.5  Any partner country 
 
RoO specifying the location of the last place of manufacture receive a higher restrictiveness score than RoO 
that do not. Rules allowing the last stage of manufacture to occur in any partner country (e.g. when the last 
process is contracted out) receive a lower restrictiveness score than rules requiring that the last place of 
manufacture be in the ‘exporting’ partner country only. 
 
  1  Exporting partner country only   
OTHER EFFECTS OF RoO 
0.05   Degree of certainty 
  0  Higher certainty (e.g. CTC alone or technical test) 
  1  Lower certainty (e.g. DVA or combination of CTC 
and DVA or technical test) 
 
Regulatory risk associated with uncertainty of origin determination (e.g. arising out of exchange rate 
fluctuations) would be expected to influence the way businesses act, thereby adding to the restrictiveness of an 
origin regime. It is therefore possible for origin regimes to be highly restrictive (e.g. CTC method applies at 
the 2-digit chapter level) but it is relatively certain. On the other hand, other methods that may be less 
restrictive, including those based on an DVA requirement with a relatively low and uniform threshold, may be 
less certain because of exogenous factors (e.g. exchange rate fluctuations). RoO based purely on DVA 
methods are considered less certain and hence more restrictive according to this criterion. RoO based on a 
combination of DVA and CTC methods are relatively less certain and are assigned the highest restrictiveness 
score. 
 
0.05   Compliance and administration costs 
  0  Most PTA members are only a member of one PTA 
  0.5  Most PTA members are involved in more than one 
PTA with similar RoO 
  1  Most PTA members are involved in more than one 
PTA with multiple RoO 
 
Membership to multiple agreements involves additional coordination efforts (the ‘spaghetti bowl’ effect). In 
such cases, the existence of multiple agreements adds to the trade restrictiveness of individual agreements. The 
restrictiveness of an agreement is considered to be at its highest when most member countries are also 
members of more than one agreement and those agreements involve more than one method for determining 
origin, while membership in only a single agreement is considered the least restrictive under to this criterion.  
 
0.05   Rigidity 
  0  No rigidity: waiver provision applied to all tariff 
items 
 
RoO that do not allow waivers for origin determination based on product-specific requirements are treated as 
more restrictive than origin rules that allow waivers 
  24   0.25  Partial rigidity: waivers allowed for a minority of 
tariff items 
  0.5  More than partial rigidity: waivers allowed for a 
majority of tariff items 
  1  Global rigidity: no waiver, RoO applies to all tariff 
items 
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ASEAN - ASEAN  29.19  114.32  -10.23  0.9  0.83  0.76  0.84  0.98  0.93  -7.78 10.53 -5.10 0.31 
ASEAN - China  -6.19  63.84  111.06  0.4  0.89  0.68  0.51  0.54  0.54  122.50 -25.00 0.00 0.43 
ASEAN - Singapore  0.57  99.51  -38.06  0.46  0.71  0.94  0.92  0.81  0.9  54.35 -2.13 11.11 0.31 
ASEAN - Thailand  49.74  67.82  12.81  0.57  0.74  0.86  0.62  0.87  0.87  29.82 -27.91 0.00 0.31 
China - India  101.81  1354.47  302.95  0.6  0.69  0.88  0.16  0.53  0.54  15.00 -81.82 1.89 0.30 
China - Singapore  49.09  197.70  167.12  0.08  0.96  0.89  0.59  0.55  0.92  1100.00 -33.71 67.27 0.43 
China - Thailand  173.43  405.45  24.49  0.92  0.98  0.89  0.43  0.11  0.07  6.52 -51.69 -36.36 0.43 
India - SAARC  165.44  -2.51  -80.99  0.28  0.27  0.01  0.05  0.52  0.04  -3.57 400.00 -92.31 0.23 
India- Thailand  140.43  312.90  -36.43  0.81  0.98 0.36  0.38  0.03 0.03  20.99 5.56 0.00 0.57 
Japan - Singapore  28.01  21.91  2.31  0.15  0.05  0.18  0.21  0.99  0.77  -66.67 16.67 -22.22 0.63 
SAARC - SAARC  135.53  -5.61  -81.18  0.86  0.59  0.45  0.45  0.58  0.88  -31.40 0.00 51.72 0.23 
SAARC – 
Singapore*  -21.81 213.61 336.33  0.6  0.65  0.5 0.72  0.03  0.26  8.33 44.00 766.67 0.27 
SAARC - Thailand  62.54  313.22  -36.43  0.52  0.77  0.28  0.31  0.03  0.03  48.08 10.71 0.00 0.23 
Singapore - Thailand  32.08  23.08  60.80  0.61 0.82 0.54  0.85  0.75 0.81  34.43 57.41 8.00 0.31 
ASEAN - ASEAN  29.19  114.32  -10.23  0.9  0.83  0.76  0.84  0.98  0.93  -7.78 10.53 -5.10 0.31 
Note: SAAR- Singapore’s restrictiveness is calculated from the average of SAARC and ASEAN’s restrictiveness 
Source: Authors’ calculations References 
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